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Abstract 
This paper traces the divergence of Singapore law from English law with regard to the grounds upon 
which a call on a performance bond can be restrained, in particular the recent recognition of the 
Singapore Court of Appeal’s ruling that “unconscionability” is a separate ground to restrain the call of a 
performance bond. This article examines the legal nature of an on demand performance bond and seeks 
to challenge the assumption that a performance bond is a mirror image of a letter of credit. This paper 
also discusses the recent case of Cargill International v. Bangladesh Sugar and Food Industries Corp. The 
paper will also seek to investigate the ambit of the notion of “unconscionability” and the general 
principles that can be drawn from a line of Singapore High Court decisions which presage this landmark 
ruling.  
 
1. Introduction 
It is heartening to note that the Lord Chancellor’s foot is still large enough (albeit acting through the 
Supreme Court of Singapore which inherited his jurisdiction in equity)1 to stop the door closing on an 
oppressed party whose on demand performance bond has been unfairly called upon. There has been a 
distinct but growing practice for parties to consider calling on performance bonds, not because they have 
suffered some damage, but because a dispute is imminent and calling on the bond is a tactical step that 
will bring the opposing party to his knees. Practitioners today are increasingly met with clients who 
blithely say: “Let’s call on the performance bond!” as if it were some kind of pre-emptive strike option 
available to them as a matter of right. Parties will now find that they have no untrammelled right in 
Singapore to call on a performance bond in their possession irrespective of the merits of their case. On 14 
August 1999, the Singapore Court of Appeal, consisting of two judges hearing an interlocutory appeal, 
published its judgment in GHL Pte Ltd v. Unitrack Building Construction Pte Ltd2  and ruled that 
“unconscionability” was a separate ground from fraud that entitled a court to restrain the call on a 
performance bond. 
 
2. Terminology 
For the sake of clarity and consistency, the terminology used by the ICC Uniform Rules of Demand 
Guarantees ICC Publication No. 458 (“the URDG”)3 will be adopted. The following are parties to a 
                                                            
 Senior Counsel, Cooma, Lau & Loh, Singapore. 
 Assistant Professor of Law, National University of Singapore. 
1 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap. 322). 
2 [1999] 4 S.L.R. 604. 
3 URDG, Art. 2. 
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domestic performance bond: (a) the principal is the person on whose account the performance guarantee 
is issued; (b) the beneficiary is the person in whose name and favour the performance bond is issued; and 
(c) the guarantor is the issuer of the performance bond. It is possible to have four parties involved in a 
performance bond. This happens when a bank is instructed to issue the performance bond in the country 
of the beneficiary. In a four party performance bond, the counter guarantee is the undertaking by the 
principal’s bank to the beneficiary’s bank and the instructing party is the issuer of the counter guarantee. 
 
3. The legal nature of the performance bond 
The archaic wording of the traditional bonds (single bonds, common money bonds and bonds with special 
conditions) will be familiar to all common law lawyers. It has been noted elsewhere4 that Halsbury5  
opines that the use of performance bonds was “rare” and that they assumed a new dimension in the 1970s 
when the countries in the Middle East, flush with petro-dollars, embarked on large capital and 
construction projects. The Middle Eastern purchasers required their suppliers in England and Europe to 
furnish performance guarantees as security for their due performance. Such performance guarantees were 
usually furnished by a Middle Eastern bank with a back-to-back arrangement with the supplier’s English 
or European bank. Such performance guarantees not only fulfilled the role of security for due 
performance of the contract, but also served as security for advance payments made by the purchasers. 
Before the widespread use of the performance bond, contracts, and especially building contracts, called 
for a cash deposit or the placement of funds in an escrow account as security for performance of the 
contract or compliance with contractual obligations. The practice then evolved with the furnishing of a 
performance bond in lieu of cash with its obvious advantages of not tying up large amounts of cash, 
increased cashflow and certainly offering a cheaper method of providing security.6 This was an important 
commercial factor that pushed the growth of this type of security as profit margins shrank. Over time, the 
traditional wording of performance bonds gave way to bonds with ever refined drafting which made them 
payable on “demand” or “by first demand”. 
 
In the construction industry, performance bonds also began to be required in a bid or tender. This 
provided the beneficiary with a safeguard against the possibility of a successful tenderer failing to enter 
into the contract. The performance bond then began to be used to ensure that the contractor complied with 
his obligations to remedy defects between periods of practical completion and the expiry of defects 
liability period. This type of performance bond for the construction industry is often issued by insurance 
companies. 
 
These performance bonds were payable “on demand” with minimal formal or evidentiary requirements 
other than a simple statement by the beneficiary that the principal was in default of his obligations. 
Nothing more was needed and the bank or  
 
  
                                                            
4 The Honourable Judge of Appeal, Justice L.P. Thean, “The 12th Singapore Law Review Lecture: The 
Enforcement of a Performance Bond: The Perspective of the Underlying Contract” (1989) 19 Sing. L.R. 
389, 393. 
5 Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th edn, vol. 12 (Butterworths, London, 1975), para. 1386. 
6 See New Civilbuild Pte Ltd v. Guobena Sdn Bhd & Another [1999] 1 S.L.R. 374, 390. 
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insurance company concerned had to make payment forthwith to the beneficiary. The drastic consequence 
of such a call was the recourse the bank or insurance company had against the beneficiary; the guarantor 
would either debit the account of the principal immediately or set off the amount paid under the 
performance bond against the principal’s cash deposits or assets or call on the indemnity executed by the 
beneficiary. Furthermore, it is the usual practice in Singapore for the principal’s directors to execute 
counter indemnities in their personal capacities when the performance bond is issued. A call on a 
performance bond inevitably results in an immediate call on these counter indemnities. 
 
Given the rise in the use of the performance guarantees in international contracts, its “payable on 
demand” nature and its issue by banks, often with back-to-back arrangements with a bank in the seller or 
supplier’s country, it is not surprising that they became viewed as part and parcel and a facilitator of 
international trade. With this background, it is easy to understand why the courts have been reluctant to 
restrain the call of a performance bond—the courts saw the performance bond as an instrument very 
similar to and then the equivalent of a letter of credit. 
 
In 1978, in Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v. Barclays Bank International Ltd,7 Lord Denning, M.R., said 
that a performance bond “stands on similar footing to a letter of credit” and they are “virtually promissory 
notes payable on demand”. The symmetry between the letter of credit and the performance bond is seen in 
numerous cases.8 By 1981, a performance bond was confidently being equated as “the equivalent of cash 
in hand”9 by the English courts. More recently, Morison, J., in Cargill International SA v. Bangladesh 
Sugar & Food Industries Corp.10 endorsed such an analysis and equated a performance bond to a valuable 
promissory note. 
 
This symmetry has also been recognized in Singapore. In Star-Trans Far East Pte Ltd v. Norske-Tech Ltd 
& Others,11 Selvam, J., said: 
Unlike a banker’s letter of credit, a performance bond or guarantee is comparatively a new 
instrument in commercial transactions. It has become typified as a mirror image of a 
documentary credit.  
 
Debattista12 elegantly summarizes the argument that can be gleaned from the cases as follows: 
performance bonds are the mirror image of letters of credit; letters of credit are autonomous from 
the sale contracts underlying them; performance bonds are therefore just as autonomous of the 
underlying contract of sale as are letters of credit. The upshot is that a call on a bond need not be 
justified under the underlying contract of sale. 
 
With this perceived similarity and equation with letters of credit, it is not surprising that the courts both in 
Singapore and England have been reluctant to restrain the call on a performance bond. The rationale for 
this view is best expressed by Kerr, J.’s judgment in Harbottle v. National West Bank,13 where he said:  
  
                                                            
7 [1978] Q.B. 159, 171. 
8 Howe Richardson v. Polimex-Cekop [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 161. 
9 Intraco Ltd. v. Notis Shipping Corp. (The Bhoja Trader) [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 256, 257. 
10 [1996] 2 All E.R. at 568; aff’d [1998] 1 W.L.R. 461 (C.A.). 
11 [1995] 3 S.L.R. 631, 640 (emphasis added). 
12 C. Debattista, “Performance Bonds and Letters of Credit: a Cracked Mirror Image” [1997] J.B.L. 289, 289. 
13 [1978] Q.B. 146, 155–156. 
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It is only in exceptional cases that the court will interfere with the machinery of irrevocable 
obligations assumed by banks. They are the lifeblood of international commerce. Such 
obligations are regarded as collateral to the underlying right and obligations between merchants at 
either end of the banking chain. Except possibly in clear cases of fraud of which the banks have 
notice, the courts will leave the merchants to settle their disputes under the contracts by litigation 
or arbitration as available to them or stipulated in the contracts. 
 
The “lifeblood of international commerce” analogy gave rise to the dramatic “thrombosis” argument 
expressed by Donaldson, L.J., in The Bhoja Trader:14  
 
In refusing to interfere with the seller’s right to call upon the bank to make payment under its 
guarantee, the learned Judge acted in conformity with the well-established principle that the Court 
will not grant an injunction unless fraud is involved (see Richardson (Howe) Scale Co. Ltd. v. 
Polimex-Cekop and Anor. [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 161). We agree with him. Irrevocable letters of 
credit and bank guarantees given in circumstances such that they are the equivalent of an 
irrevocable letter of credit have been said to be the life blood of commerce. Thrombosis will 
occur if, unless fraud is involved, the Courts intervene and thereby disturb the mercantile practice 
of treating rights thereunder as being the equivalent of cash in hand. 
 
The courts thus refused, except in the case of fraud, to intervene in such instruments of commerce 
representing the “lifeblood of international commerce” for fear that their undue judicial interference 
would result in thrombosis occurring in the market place.15 These views were also adopted elsewhere in 
the Commonwealth: see, e.g., C.D.N. Research and Development Ltd v. Bank of Nova Scotia,16 where the 
Ontario High Court of Justice, Divisional Court, adopted and applied the principles enunciated in the 
Edward Owen17  case. 
 
Until recently, the Singapore courts appeared to have accepted this symmetry without question. The 
Singapore Court of Appeal’s landmark ruling in Bocotra Construction Pte Ltd & Others v. Attorney 
General (No. 2)18 summarizes the principles from the cases governing performance bonds as follows: 
Of the various propositions of law suggested by the respondent, four principles may be extracted: 
 
(a) The ‘autonomy’ principle —the guarantee constitutes a separate contract from the underlying 
transaction. The appellants are not privy to the guarantee. 
(b) The ‘cash in hand’ principle —reflecting the importance of promoting commercial efficacy and 
certainty in the use of letters, guarantees and bonds. This ties in with the ‘autonomy’ principle. 
(c) The ‘fraud’ exception —the sole exception to the ‘autonomy’ and ‘cash in hand’ principles arises 
where the plaintiff can establish fraud in the circumstances of the call or payment. This permits 
injunctive relief. 
(d) There is no distinction between cases where an injunction is to restrain a bank (on payment) or the 
beneficiary under the guarantee (on calling for payment). 
 
                                                            
14 [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 256, 257 (emphasis added). 
15 See also supra, fn. 6. 
16 [1981] 136 D.L.R. (3d) 656. 
17 Supra, fn. 7. 
18 [1995] 2 S.L.R. 733, 744; noted L. Hsu [1996] LMCLQ 33. 
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4. Symmetry and abusive calls on performance bond 
Conceptually the apparent symmetry between letters of credit and performance bonds is flawed. One of 
the few voices in the wilderness, Eveleigh, L.J., correctly identified the main difference between a letter 
of credit and a performance bond. In Potton Homes Ltd v. Coleman Contractors 19 he pointed out that: 
While from the point of view of the bank the underlying contract is irrelevant and the bank’s contract with 
the seller is independent of it, nonetheless as between buyer and seller the underlying contract may not be 
irrelevant. 
 
Another English Court of Appeal judge, Parker, L.J., echoed the same reservation in GKN Contractors 
Ltd v. Lloyds Bank Plc and Another: 20 
Turning to the law, the cases clearly establish that transactions by way of performance guarantee 
are similar to, albeit not identical with, the transaction under confirmed letters of credit. The 
analogy cannot, however, be pressed too far, because in the case of performance guarantees there 
are, not merely one set of documents passing up the chain with one question arising, namely, 
whether the documents tendered were or were not in accordance with the credit, but three 
different contracts. It is true that in the case of letters of credit there are also different contracts, 
but the difference in the case of performance guarantees is that there are differing documents 
between each case. 
 
In Singapore, the same reservations were being echoed. In Chartered Electronic Industries Pte Ltd v. The 
Development Bank of Singapore Ltd,21 Chan, J. (as he then was) said: 
 
A performance guarantee does not perform the same function as a documentary letter of credit in 
international trade, nor does it cause the same degree of hardship to the party concerned if a 
temporary restraining order is granted. The former is merely a security whereas the letter of credit 
is an established mode of payment in exchange for goods. The letter of credit has been the life 
blood of commerce in international trade for hundreds of years. But the same cannot be said of 
the performance guarantee or the performance bond…. A merchant who has to ship his goods to a 
buyer abroad should be protected as to his right of payment. A beneficiary under a performance 
guarantee should be protected as to the integrity of his security in the case of non-performance…. 
A temporary restraining order does not affect the security nor the beneficiary’s rights in it. It 
merely postpones the realisation of the security until the plaintiff is given an opportunity to prove 
his case. 
 
Debattista22 has seized on the dicta of Eveleigh, L.J., in the Potton Homes case and has argued that the 
mirror image between performance bonds and letters of credit is a cracked image. Debattista makes out a 
powerful case on why he says this is so. First, he points out that the letter of credit is a primary payment 
mechanism whereas the performance bond is a secondary mechanism. Secondly, the performance bond is 
an inducement to the seller to perform the contract of sale of goods and far from being autonomous of that 
contract, the performance bond is a device pointing towards the performance of the contract; thus, the 
bond is a “child of the contract”. Thirdly (and this is Debattista’s most powerful argument), the principle 
of autonomy is justified in a documentary credit situation because  
  
                                                            
19 [1984] 28 B.L.R. 19, 26. 
20 [1985] 30 B.L.R. 48, 62 (emphasis added). 
21 [1999] 4 S.L.R. 665, 668. This dictum is also cited by Thean (1989) 19 Sing. L.R. 389, 403. 
22 Supra, fn. 12. 
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the bank’s obligation is to pay against something of value, i.e., commercial documents such as bills of 
lading etc.; however, this is not true with regard to performance bonds—the bank is obliged to pay for 
nothing of value; this point was also highlighted by Eveleigh, L.J., in Potton Homes v. Coleman.23 The 
arguments presented by Debattista are unanswerable. 
 
In GHL Pte Ltd v. Unitrack Building Construction Pte Ltd,24 the Singapore Court of Appeal has 
recognized this fallacious equation of performance bonds with letters of credit and authoritatively ruled 
that a performance bond cannot always be viewed distinctly from the underlying contract: 
We are concerned with abusive calls on the bonds. It should not be forgotten that a performance bond can 
operate as an oppressive instrument, and in the event that a beneficiary calls on the bond in 
circumstances… It should also not be forgotten that a performance bond is basically a security for the 
performance of the main contract, and as such we see no reason, in principle, why it should be so 
sacrosanct and inviolate as not to be subject to the court’s intervention except on the ground of fraud. We 
agree that a beneficiary under a performance bond should be protected as to the integrity of the security 
he has in case of non-performance by the party on whose account the performance bond was issued, but a 
temporary restraining order does not prejudice or adversely affect the security; it merely postpones the 
realisation of the security until the party concerned is given an opportunity to prove his case. 
 
The Singapore Court of Appeal is, with respect, absolutely correct in its analysis. The performance bond 
is “basically a security for the performance of the main contract”. Once this is accepted, it follows that the 
underlying contract cannot be entirely irrelevant under all circumstances. If so, then the fault lines in the 
apparent symmetry between performance bonds and letters of credit widen beyond repair. 
 
Quite apart from the conceptual arguments set out above the alleged symmetry between letters of credit 
and performance bonds must be rejected on policy grounds as well. 
 
In the construction industry, the provision of a performance bond can leave the principal at the mercy of 
an unscrupulous beneficiary. In certain cases, it is not unforeseeable that an abusive call may effectively 
cripple the principal financially. Arbitration or litigation is expensive business. An abusive call may 
render the principal insolvent or incapable financially to proceed to arbitration or litigation, a fortiori if 
the principal’s directors have executed counter indemnities in their personal capacities and these have also 
been called upon by the guarantor. The principal would have to give up legitimate claims due to the fact 
that it is financially incapable of mounting an arbitration or litigation proceedings to recover what is due 
to him. A tactical call on a performance bond would probably force the principal either to give up his 
claim entirely or to settle the claim unfavourably. 
 
The danger of abusive calls also exists in the international sale of goods. Reported cases bear testimony to 
this. As will be seen below, a purchaser in default of his contractual obligations to open a letter of credit 
called on the performance bond clearly as a tactical move either to evade further performance or to force a 
possible settlement.25 It is not beyond contemplation for a buyer to call on the bond in order to try to vary 
the terms of  
  
                                                            
23 Supra, fn. 19. 
24 [1999] 4 S.L.R. 604, 615 (emphasis added). 
25 Kvaerner Singapore Pte Ltd v. UDL Shipbuilding Pte Ltd [1993] 3 S.L.R. 350. 
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a contract that has turned out unfavourably to him or to obtain a discount from the agreed price. 
 
Once it is accepted, as it was by the Court of Appeal in GHL v. Unitrack, that the performance bond is 
basically a security for the performance of the main contract, there is no reason in principle "why it 
should be so sacrosanct and inviolate as not to be subject to the court's intervention except on the ground 
of fraud". As any practitioner can attest to, achieving a sufficient level of proof of fraud at an 
interlocutory stage is very difficult except in an exceptional minority of cases. The acknowledged danger 
of abusive calls is the very reason why the court should intervene even if the conduct of the beneficiary 
falls short of fraud but achieves such a level of unconscionability that would offend the notions of justice 
for a court to stand by and do nothing, fearful of a thrombosis in the market place or interrupting the life 
blood of commerce. 
 
5. Unconscionability—the divergence of Singapore law 
As noted above, there were judicial misgivings both in England and in Singapore for carrying the 
equation of performance bonds with letters of credit too far. The divergence of Singapore law on this 
point occurred in 1991 in Royal Design Studio Pte Ltd v. Chang Development.26 Here, the plaintiff agreed 
to construct and complete nine units of three-storey terrace houses for the defendant. The defendant 
agreed on completion of the construction to convey to the plaintiff 3 1/2 units of the houses to be 
constructed. A performance bond of S$ 120,000 was issued on the plaintiffs account. As in numerous 
building contracts, disputes arose between the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant had delayed the payments under the interim certificates and that this had put a severe strain on 
the plaintiff’s cash flow and hampered the progress of the work, which led to delay in the works. The 
defendant, on the other hand, complained of undue delay in the progress of the work. Subsequently, the 
defendant terminated the contract by way of notice in writing. The plaintiff retaliated by obtaining an 
injunction to restrain the defendant from calling on the performance bond. Thean, J. (as he then was) held 
that he was not precluded from considering the main and underlying contract between the plaintiff and the 
defendant and took into account the following factors in restraining the call of the performance bond: 
 
i. the plaintiff could not proceed with the construction of the houses because the defendant refused 
to make the interim payments; 
ii. under the agreement the plaintiff would be entitled to 3 1/2 units of the houses, seven units of the 
houses had in fact been sold; the total price of the plaintiff s 3 1/2 units amounted to S$ 1.575 
million; however, the defendant had paid the plaintiff only S$948,021.21. There was thus not 
insignificant outstanding monies in the hands of the defendant that could be used to set off any 
damages payable; and 
iii. the director of the plaintiff had issued a personal guarantee to the defendant in the sum of S$1 
million and there was no suggestion that this guarantee was worthless. 
 
Thean, J., implicitly rejected the ritual incantation of the symmetry argument and held that:27  
  
                                                            
26 [1991] 2 M.L.J. 229; noted L. Hsu [1992] LMCLQ 297. 
27 Ibid., 234. 
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Taking into account all these matters, it would be wrong, in my opinion, merely to accept the 
assertion of the defendant that the plaintiff was in breach of contract; that on that ground the 
defendant was entitled to call on the bond, and that the bond is like a letter of credit, and not to 
consider whether or not the defendant should be restrained from calling on the bond. All relevant 
facts of the case must be considered. 
 
A second case occurred two years later in 1993—Kvaerner Singapore Pte Ltd v. UDL Shipbuilding 
(Singapore) Pte Ltd.28 This time it was in the context of an international sales contract. The plaintiffs had 
agreed to sell to the defendants a pumping system and a cargo valve control system for S$ 1,000,000. The 
defendants were required under the agreement to make part payment of 30% of the purchase price. The 
remainder of the purchase price was to be made by way of an irrevocable letter of credit issued by a 
Singapore bank. The plaintiffs in turn were required to deliver to the defendants a performance bond for 
30% of the purchase price. The defendants made a deposit of S$300,000 but failed to open the letter of 
credit for the remainder. In view of the defendants’ failure to open the letter of credit, the plaintiffs treated 
the contract as discharged and did not ship the goods. The defendants then made a demand for payment 
under the performance bond. The plaintiffs applied for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the payment 
of the performance bond. The interlocutory injunction was granted as the learned judge held that the 
opening of the letter of credit was a condition precedent to the plaintiffs’ obligation to ship or deliver the 
goods and the time for establishing the credit was of essence of the contract of sale. Selvam, J.C. (as he 
then was) applied Potton Homes v. Coleman Contractors Ltd 29 and ruled that the fraud exception is not 
“an immutable principle of universal application”. The learned judge continued:30  
 
And in my view it has no application where the injunction is sought against a party to the 
underlying contract who seeks to take advantage of the performance guarantee where by his own 
volition he fails to perform a condition precedent in the sense I have described. 
 
Both these cases were considered in detail by the Singapore Court of Appeal in the landmark Bocotra31 
case in a judgment written by Karthigesu, J.A., who, after citing Royal Design and Kvaerner, said: 
 
In our opinion, whether there is fraud or unconscionability is the sole consideration in 
applications for injunctions restraining payment or calls on bonds to be granted. Once this can be 
established, there is no necessity to expend energies in addressing the superfluous question of 
“balance of convenience”. It does not lie in the mouth of the defendant to claim that damages 
would still somehow be an adequate remedy. 
 
Karthigesu, J.A., then continued:32  
 
we need only note that dispensing with consideration of the balance of convenience does not 
make an injunction any easier to obtain. Indeed, a higher degree of strictness applies, as the 
applicant will be required to establish a clear case of fraud or unconscionability in interlocutory 
proceedings. It is clear that mere allegations are insufficient. 
 
                                                            
28 [1993] 3 S.L.R. 350. 
29 Supra, fn. 19. 
30 [1993] 3 S.L.R. 350, 353. 
31 [1995] 2 S.L.R. 733, 746 (emphasis added). 
32 Ibid., 747 (emphasis added). 
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It is important to note that this is the first time where the term “unconscionability” was specifically 
mentioned as a ground for restraining the call of a performance bond. It was not entirely clear whether the 
words “fraud” and “unconscionability” were to be read conjunctively or disjunctively. On the facts, the 
Singapore Court of Appeal declined to restrain the call on the performance bond as the appellant’s claim 
was founded on a vague assertion that the status quo must be preserved in the interests of justice. 
 
This new and amorphous “unconscionable” ground in Bocotra was seized upon by Lai Kew Chai, J., in 
Raymond Construction Pte Ltd v. Low Ya Tong & Another.33 Lai Kew Chai, J., had no difficulty in 
attempting to define the ambit of “unconscionability”. Lai Kew Chai, J., observed that: 
 
The concept of “unconscionability” to me involves unfairness, as distinct from dishonesty or 
fraud, or conduct of a kind so reprehensible or lacking in good faith that a court of conscience 
would either restrain the party or refuse to assist the party. Mere breaches of contract by the party 
in question… would not by themselves be unconscionable. Where breaches are alleged, there 
would generally be (counter-allegations and) disputes when the case is before the court. Therefore 
the first defendant’s breaches alone would not have sufficed. In my view, Royal Design Studio 
(Thean, J. as he then was) and Kvaerner Singapore (Selvam, J.) are illustrations of the 
circumstances where payments would have been unconscionable. 
 
On the facts, the learned judge found that the defendant had acted “unconscionably” and therefore granted 
the injunction restraining a call on the performance bond. The plaintiffs were building contractors. The 
defendant was the owner who entered into a contract with the plaintiffs to build a two-storey detached 
dwelling house (“the house”). A performance bond was issued to the defendant. The following factors 
were taken into account in holding that the defendant had acted “unconscionably”: 
 
i. the defendant was a very poor pay master and had resorted to drawing defective cheques to delay 
payment; 
ii. there were several bankruptcy notices issued against the defendant which showed that he was 
remarkably predisposed not to honour his financial commitments; the wife of the first defendant 
had in fact been adjudged bankrupt; 
iii. the architect’s fees had not been paid by the defendant; 
iv. an interim claim by the plaintiffs was not paid which amounted to 30% of the contract sum; 
v. the plaintiffs asserted that the architect interfered with his scope of work and the allegation had 
not been denied by the architect; 
vi. the defendant had obstructed the work; the defendant had not chosen the marble in a timely 
manner, repeatedly changed his mind in respect of the marble newel post, changed the curvatures 
of the cornices, delayed in the construction of the culvert to the house (which was his 
responsibility) and delayed the installation of the extra water tank by alleging trespass; 
vii. the costs of rectification of defects were found to be inflated to justify the call on the performance 
bond; and 
viii. the defendant had pressurized the architect to withdraw a previous interim certificate of payment.  
 
  
                                                            
33 Suit No. 1715 of 1995 (11 July 1996) Unreported (emphasis added). 
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The concept of “unconscionability” was again invoked by Lai Kew Chai, J., in Min Thai Holdings Pte Ltd 
v. Sunlabel Pte Ltd and Another.34 In this case, there was a contract between the first defendant and the 
second defendant. The first defendant agreed to buy and the second defendant agreed to sell 50,000 metric 
tons of white rice of Chinese origin. In this agreement, it was provided that the “ultimate seller” would be 
required to post a performance bond to the first defendant. It was common ground that the ultimate sellers 
were the plaintiffs. Furthermore, the learned judge found that the white rice was to be supplied from 
Heilong Jiang and Jiang Xi province in China. In the premises, Lai Kew Chai, J., held that it was 
“unconscionable” for the first defendant to receive payment from the performance bond because: 
 
i. severe flooding took place in Heilong Jiang and Jiang Xi. These floods were of the kind which 
China had not experienced in the last 100 years; 
ii. there was also a question whether there was a dispute between the first defendant and the second 
defendant over the applicability of the ICC Force Majeure Conditions; and 
iii. there was evidence that the plaintiffs attempted to find alternative sources which were of lower 
grade which, admittedly, the first defendant could reject.  
 
The learned judge said that it was unconscionable for the first defendant to attempt to receive payment 
under the performance bond. Lai Kew Chai, J., held that they were perfectly entitled to make a call on the 
performance bond because there was an expiry date but they should have in all good conscience offered 
to let the money remain in the bank until the resolution of disputes between the parties. 
 
The High Court made a brief return to orthodoxy in the judgment of Lee, J.C., in New Civilbuild Pte Ltd 
v. Guobena Sdn Bhd & Another.35 After a careful examination of the previous authorities, Lee, J.C., 
firmly rejected the notion of “unconscionability” as a separate ground to restrain the call of the 
performance bond and concluded that the term “unconscionability” was used by the Court of Appeal 
interchangeably with the notion of fraud. Lee, J.C., resorted to the well known “thrombosis argument” 
and said:36  
 
Indeed the road may well be too far travelled now to admit any such concept [as 
unconscionability]. Performance bonds used in commercial situations are given by businessmen 
who deal at arms length and, if not with legal advice, at least with a full understanding of the risks 
and consequences… Today performance bonds are given by Singaporean financial institutions 
not only for local projects but also for projects overseas, particularly in the region. It is important 
that the law in relation to such bonds be placed on a clear and unambiguous footing in order that 
they continue to be accepted by beneficiary parties whether in Singapore or abroad. 
 
All these cases culminated in the landmark Singapore Court of Appeal ruling in GHL v. Unitrack.37 Here, 
the appellants were the owners and were desirous of constructing a five-storey boarding house. They 
engaged the first respondent to be the main contractor for the project. The contract sum for the project 
was S$5,781,400 which included a sum of S$3,820,000 for sub-contract works. Pursuant to the contract, 
the first respondent was obliged to procure the issue of the performance bond for an amount equal to 10% 
of the  
  
                                                            
34 [1999] 2 S.L.R. 368. 
35 [1999] 1 S.L.R. 374. 
36 Ibid., 390. 
37 [1999] 4 S.L.R. 604. 
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contract sum. The first respondent duly procured the same in the amount of S$578,140 in favour of the 
appellants. The performance bond was kept by the first respondent and was not handed to the appellants. 
Subsequently, the contract between the appellants and the first respondent was revised. The appellants 
would pay the sub-contractors directly and the contract sum was revised downward to S$ 1,961,400. A 
dispute arose between the appellants and the first respondent. The appellants attempted to call on the 
performance bond. The respondents applied for and obtained an ex parte interlocutory injunction 
preventing them from calling on the bond. The appellants applied to discharge the interlocutory 
injunction. Rubin, J., referred to the facts and said that “the principles of fairness warranted the 
continuation of the injunction order.”38 In the meantime he ordered the second respondent, the insurance 
company which issued the performance bond, not to cancel the bond. Upon hearing further argument, the 
learned judge made his stand clearer by quoting from the Bocotra decision and from Lai Kew Chai, J.’s 
recent decision in the Min Thai case with its emphasis on “unconscionability.” 
 
On appeal, the Singapore Court of Appeal took the opportunity to review the law and restate the law with 
regard to performance bonds. The analysis in New Civilbuild was considered and firmly rejected. The 
Court of Appeal stated unequivocally that “unconscionability” was a separate ground for restraining the 
call of a performance bond. It was held that the term was adopted after deliberation which represented a 
conscious departure from English law. This was “not inadvertently inserted as a result of a slip; nor was it 
intended to be used synonymously or interchangeably with fraud”.39 In the present case, the Singapore 
Court of Appeal allowed the injunction on the grounds that since there was a drastic revision of the 
contract sum, the amount of the bond should correspondingly be reduced to 10% of the revised contract 
sum. 
 
6. General principles to be drawn from the cases 
(a) What is meant by a call that is “unconscionable”? 
The Singapore Court of Appeal’s recognition of the fallacy of the symmetry argument and rejection of the 
argument that the underlying contract is irrelevant to the performance bond under all circumstances 
should be welcomed. The law cannot be so straitjacketed that it is constrained to stand by and watch, 
powerless to intervene, while an unconscionable call on a bond or a call that represents conduct which is 
so reprehensible or lacking in good faith that it offends all notions of justice is made. That this should be 
so should come as no surprise. The very raison d’être for equity is its complementary nature to step in 
and mitigate the harshness or injustice that may result when a legal system has developed and matured 
into set principles and rules.40 For that same reason equity cannot be constrained into immutable rules; it 
must have some certainty but it must also remain fluid enough to deal with new situations created by 
developments of mankind and its social systems. It is with this in mind that the authors of this paper 
attempt to draw the general principles that can be found in the cases discussed above.  
 
  
                                                            
38 Ibid., 609. (emphasis added). 
39 Ibid., 610. 
40 P.V. Baker & P. St. J. Langan (ed.), Snell’s Equity, 29th edn (London, 1990), 5–6. 
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The notion of “unconscionability” is undoubtedly a creature of equity. While conceptually there is no 
objection to equitable notions being applied to injunctive relief as the same is an equitable remedy, the 
core or umbral ambit of “unconscionability” should be clear leaving a permissible penumbra of uncertain 
width to deal with novel situations. Too frequent challenges to the call on a performance bond and 
uncertainty as to when a challenge will succeed will undermine the utility and efficacy of such 
instruments. Its usefulness to trade and industry and therefore its proliferation should not be overlooked. 
It is not unforeseeable that, if such challenges get out of hand and frequently result in at least two rounds 
before the court of first instance and the Court of Appeal, thereby incurring huge legal fees and time, 
future beneficiaries will simply insist that the cash deposit be reinstated or to state that the performance 
bond is to be governed by English law; a fortiori if the state of Singapore law on performance bonds is 
uncertain. 
 
It appears apt to pay heed to Professor Birks’41 warning of the use of the term “unconscionable” albeit in 
another context. Professor Birks argues that the word “unconscionable” is so unspecific that it simply 
conceals a private and intuitive evaluation. He quotes the Gestapo chief Heydrich to prove the 
unreliability of conscience. Heydrich had said: “For the fulfilment of my task I do fundamentally that for 
which I can answer to my conscience… I completely indifferent whether others gabble about breaking the 
law.” 
 
It would seem that “unconscionability” in the Singapore legal context connotes: 
i. “unfairness”;42 or 
ii. “conduct of a kind so reprehensible or lacking in good faith that a court of conscience 
would either restrain the party or refuse to assist the party”;43 and 
iii. that mere breaches of contract are by themselves not unconscionable.44  
 
This definition of the term “unconscionability” does not seem to take us very far in ascertaining when a 
call is “unconscionable”. It may well amount to a private and intuitive evaluation of counsel which may 
not always accord with those of the court. The cases above seem to have held that the following factors 
are relevant in holding that the call of a performance bond is unconscionable: 
i. where the breach the beneficiary is alleging in order to call on the performance bond 
is caused by the beneficiary’s own breach of contract;45  
ii. where the beneficiary still holds a substantial amount of monies due and owing to the 
principal quite apart from the performance bond;46  
  
                                                            
41 Peter Birks, “Trusts Raised to Reverse Unjust Enrichment: The Westdeutsche Case” [1996] R.L.R. 3, 20–21. 
42 Raymond Construction v. Low Ya Tong & Another (Suit No. 1715 of 1995:1 July 1996), Unreported. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Royal Design Studio Pte Ltd v. Chang Development Pte Ltd [1991] 2 M.L.J. 229 (beneficiary’s failure to make 
timely payment of interim certificates which resulted in the delay in the construction work); Kvaerner Singapore Pte 
Ltd v. UDL Shipbuilding (Singapore) Pte Ltd [1993] 3 S.L.R. 350 (beneficiary’s failure to open letter of credit in 
time, thus discharging the principal’s obligation to ship the goods); Raymond Construction v. Low Ya Tong (1 July 
1996) Unreported (where the architect had not denied that he had interfered with the principal’s scope of works; 
there was also evidence that the beneficiary had obstructed the timely construction of the works). 
46 Royal Design Studio Pte Ltd v. Chang Development Pte Ltd [1991] 2 M.L.J. 229. 
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iii. where it can be shown that the beneficiary is not a person who honours his financial 
commitments;47  
iv. where the alleged. breach had been inflated to justify the call on the performance 
bond;48 and 
v. where the performance bond was provided to be a percentage of the contract price 
and the contract price had been drastically reduced downwards.49  
 
While the authors of this paper would hesitate to call for any rigid and closed list of grounds which would 
make a call on a performance bond “unconscionable”, it is our view that general guidelines must be spelt 
out. Otherwise, this would give rise to the unenviable situation where almost every call on a performance 
bond will be subject to challenge. Numerous and/or bulky and/or prolix affidavits will be filed at the 
interlocutory stage either to make out a case of unconscionability or to justify the call on the bond; 
numerous allegations and counter allegations will be made by each party, untested by cross-examination; 
and the unenviable task of the judge at that stage would be to make an assessment of which of the many 
allegations are true and who is likely to be telling the truth by a mere perusal of affidavits. 
 
It is on this note that the authors of this article offer a critique of the case of Min Thai Holdings Pte Ltd v. 
Sunlabel Pte Ltd,50 discussed above. The critique is made with great timidity and with the greatest 
deference to a well known judge of equity and whose judgment in Min Thai was endorsed in GHL v. 
Unitrack.  
 
In Min Thai, Lai Kew Chai, J., made a distinction between “unconscionability” in “receiving payment 
under a performance bond” and “unconscionability” in calling on a performance bond. He held that a call 
on the performance bond was justified because the expiry date of the performance bond was nearing. 
However, the learned judge held that the first defendant should have kept the money in the bank pending 
the resolution of the dispute. It would appear that the learned judge was of this view because: (i) the 
contemplated source of the goods had experienced severe floods; and (ii) there was an argument that the 
same is excepted by a force majeure clause. 
 
This case poses several problems. First, it is very difficult to see any “unconscionability” in the call on the 
performance bond. On the facts, the judge had held there was none. Secondly, the judge drew a 
distinction between “unconscionability” in receiving payment under a performance bond and 
“unconscionability” in calling on a performance bond. With great respect, such a distinction is untenable. 
There can be no distinction in receiving payment under a performance bond and making a call on the 
same as payment would, in the absence of fraud, inevitably follow. Such distinction does not have the 
benefit of any authority. While it is true that this case has been cited by the Singapore Court of Appeal in 
GHL v. Unitrack, the authors of this paper would respectfully argue that, on the facts as they appear on 
the judgment, the call on the performance bond should not have been restrained.  
  
                                                            
47 Raymond Construction v. Low Ya Tong (1 July 1996) Unreported. 
48 Ibid. (where the rectification works were inflated). 
49 GHL v. Unitrack [1999] 4 S.L.R. 604. 
50 [1999] 2 S.L.R. 368 (supra, fn. 34). 
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(b) The standard of proof required 
In Bocotra,51 Karthigesu, J.A., said that “a higher degree of strictness applies”. The principal must 
“establish a clear case of fraud or unconscionability in interlocutory proceedings. It is clear that mere 
allegations are insufficient”. This has been exemplified by GP Selvam, J., in Star-Trans Far East Pte Ltd 
v. Norske-Tech Ltd,52 where he held that “the party making the application must come up with compelling 
evidence”. Pronouncements of this nature reflect the legal adage: “in proportion as the crime is enormous, 
so ought the proof to be clear” found in the cases dealing with fire insurance fraud.53 This pronouncement 
has been applied in civil cases as well. 
 
However, there is some confusion as to whether a less strict standard of proof is now required after GHL 
v. Unitrack. The Singapore Court of Appeal in that case stated54 that: 
 
It should not be forgotten that a performance bond can operate as an oppressive instrument, and 
in the event that a beneficiary calls on the bond in circumstances, where there is prima facie 
evidence of fraud or unconscionability, the court should step in to intervene at the interlocutory 
stage until the whole of the circumstances of the case has been investigated. 
 
With due respect, the reference to prima facie evidence of fraud or “unconscionability” as the standard of 
proof is unfortunate as this represents a significant departure from the standard of proof enunciated in 
Bocotra. However, the tenor of the rest of the judgment does not appear to be a departure from Bocotra. 
In fact, the judgment appears to be a whole-hearted endorsement of the analysis in Bocotra. On balance, it 
would appear that the standard of proof required is still the stricter standard of proof required in Bocotra 
and not merely prima facie evidence. This analysis is supported by a subsequent Court of Appeal decision 
Dauphin v. The Private Office of HRH Sheikh Sultan bin Khalifa,55 which clarified that the standard of 
proof required is a strong prima facie case of unconscionability. 
 
 
7. The English position 
The divergence of the Singapore cases become more apparent when they are contrasted with the recent 
English case of Cargill International v. Bangladesh Sugar and Food Industries Corp.56 In this case the 
performance bond was issued pursuant to a sale of sugar on c. & f. terms. Clause 13 of the contract of sale 
provided that the performance bond was “liable to be forfeited” if the plaintiffs failed to fulfil any terms 
and conditions of the contract; and cl. 16 further provided that if the plaintiffs failed to adhere to the 
arrival time they were liable “to forfeit” the bond. The vessel that was used to ship the goods was contrary 
to a stipulation of the contract and arrived late. The defendants attempted to call on the performance bond. 
The plaintiffs applied for injunctive relief and tried to restrain the call on the performance bond. The 
plaintiffs argued that the defendants were not  
  
                                                            
51 [1995] 2 S.L.R. 733 (supra, fn. 18). 
52 [1995] 3 S.L.R. 631, 643. 
53 Hornal v. Neuberger [1957] 1 Q.B. 247. See Bater v. Bater [1951] P. 37. 
54 [1999] 4 S.L.R. 604, 615 (emphasis added). 
55 [2000] 1 S.L.R. 657, 672. 
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entitled to make any call on the bond or to retain any money so received on the ground that the defendants 
had suffered no loss as the market price of sugar had fallen at the time of delivery. In a judgment 
subsequently upheld in the Court of Appeal, Morison, J., held57 that: 
 
The court will not grant an injunction in either case unless there has been a lack of good faith. 
The justification for this lies in the commercial purpose of the bond. Such a bond is, effectively, 
as valuable as a promissory note and is intended to affect the “tempo” of the parties’ obligations; 
in the sense that when an allegation of breach of contract is made (in good faith), the beneficiary 
can call the bond and receive its value pending the resolution of the contractual disputes. He does 
not have to await the final determination of his rights before he receives some moneys. On an 
application for an injunction, it is, therefore, not pertinent that the beneficiary may be wrong to 
have called the bond because, after the trial or arbitration, the breach may not be established; 
otherwise, the court would be frustrating the commercial purpose of the bond. The concept that 
money must be paid without question, and the rights and wrongs argued about later, is a familiar 
one in international trade, and substantial building contracts. 
 
It was held that, if it is found later that the damage suffered by the beneficiary did not exceed the 
performance bond, there was an obligation on the defendants’ part to account to the plaintiffs. 
This case illustrates the divergence of English position and the Singaporean position. The English courts 
take the view that the performance bond, in absence of fraud, is entirely divorced from the underlying 
contract. The refusal by the Commercial Court and the Court of Appeal to investigate the plaintiffs’ 
allegation that no losses had been suffered by the defendants represents the high water mark of the 
English courts’ insistence on the principle of autonomy. It would certainly appear that if the allegation 
made was true then the defendants’ call, although not fraudulent, was merely to seek a tactical advantage 
and perhaps force a favourable settlement. It is likely that a Singapore court would have investigated the 
merits of this allegation. If this allegation was found to be true the Singapore court would have injuncted 
the call of the performance bond. 
 
8. Conclusion 
As can be seen from the discussion above, the ambit of the notion of “unconscionability” is far from 
settled and some confusion has been thrown on the standard of proof required. In particular, the Min 
Thai58 case suggests a relaxation of the court’s attitude in granting injunctive relief to restrain the call on 
the performance bond. However, such a relaxation of standards, while well-intentioned, may not augur 
well for the integrity of the performance bond if the principles governing the same are not spelt out 
clearly and unequivocally. As noted above, the international community or the construction industry may 
well return to the cash deposit instead of accepting a performance bond in lieu. Given the current 
economic advantage of developers and owners over contractors fighting for scarce jobs, this insistence on 
a cash deposit is quite possible. While such new developments are welcome and exciting, international 
traders, the construction industry <page 363> and the lawyers who advise them need to know when they 
can restrain the call on a performance bond. It will be of great interest to see whether the other 
Commonwealth jurisdictions will follow the intervention of equity in Singapore or whether they will 
continue to endorse the English position.  
 
                                                            
57 [1996] 4 All E.R. 563, 568. 
58 [1999] 2 S.L.R. 368 (supra, fn. 34). 
